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THE ECOSYSTEM FOR
ORGANIZED CRIME
The intellectual study of organized crime suffers from
at least four major distractions: (a) mixing overall
analysis with the requirements of prosecution, (b)
understating the diversity of criminal cooperation, (c)
underestimating how crime cooperation interacts with
legitimate activities, and (d) overestimating the degree
of planning and sophistication needed for offender
symbiosis to occur. This paper draws from the life
sciences to analyze criminal cooperation in full diversity,
yet with greater clarity. In the process, the author
produces twelve principles to help understand “the
web of criminal cooperation.” The author distinguishes
public, semipublic, semiprivate, and private aspects of
criminal cooperation, and emphasizes the dependence
of organized crime on the failure to manage public
space.
The advent of the European Union has brought
with it new opportunities for organized crime. It has
energized not only police but also scholars, who have
produced many new studies and ideas.1 These scholars
have extended earlier American work,2 giving the field
of organized crime research a new life.
THE PROBLEM
The televised version of organized crime depicts highly
organized people in business suits sitting around a table
for meetings, with intricate coordination across a vast
field, and a certain brilliance of mind. Scholars have
long told us that the televised version of organized crime
is substantially wrong – that most organized crime is
much smaller in scale and coordination.3 Even when
its chain of events reaches widely, seldom is it centrally
coordinated in a careful way. In some cases local
coordination can be strong, but the wider the span of
crime the lower the probability that coordination is highly
centralized. In short, the public image of organized
crime fits relatively badly in nature, perhaps with a few
exceptions.
New European scholarship more than verifies this
general point. Drug sales, cigarette tax evasions,
corruption, and other crimes are not highly centralized
or coordinated in vast terms. This is quite consistent
with earlier American work on different types of illicit
gambling, racketeering and criminal cooperation – some
of which can be coordinated to an extent, but not
consistently so.
European police experts and scholars have further
diversified the examples of criminal cooperation and
organization.4 Further, organized crime research around
the world is increasingly carried out and available in
the English language. Combined with American
research, we are at a unique moment in the history of
research on criminal cooperation and organization. We
know more than ever. We know the televised model
seldom applies. We know that organized criminal actions
are diverse and often loose. But we have no image of
organized crime to replace the discredited image. The
problem is to find a suitable image, explain it, and offer
some ideas about how to use it.
1 European work at HEUNI includes Jon Spencer, Kauko Aromaa, Mika Junninen, Anna Markina, Jüri Saar and Terhi Viljanen,
2006, “Organized crime, corruption and the movement of people across borders in th enlarged EU: A case study of Estonia,
Finland, and the UK.” Heuni Papers Series No 24. Helsinki: HEUNI. In addition, see Petrus C. van Duyne, Matjaz Jaeger, Klaus
von Lampe and James Newell, Editors, Threats and Phantoms of Organized Crime, Corruption and Terrorism. 2004. Nijmegen,
the Netherlands: Wolf Legal Publishers.
2 See especially the work of Peter Reuter, including but not limited to Disorganized Crime: The Economics of the Visible Hand.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
3 See the references above, as well as Rick Brown and Ronald V. Clarke, Police Intelligence and Theft of Vehicles for Export:
Recent U.K. Experience. Crime Prevention Studies, Vol. 17, 2004, pp. 173-192 (Michael G. Maxfield and Ronald V. Clarke, Editors,
Devon, UK: Willan.) Also see Mangai Natarajan and Ronald V. Clarke. Understanding and Controlling Organised Crime: The
Feasibility of a Situational Approach. Paper presented at ECCA, Wellington, New Zealand, July 2004. Finally, take note of
Derek B. Cornish and Ronald V. Clarke, “Analyzing Organized Crimes,” Chapter 3 in Alex R. Piquero and Stephen G. Tibbetts,
Editors, Rational Choice and Criminal Behavior: Recent Research and Future Challenges, New York and London: Routledge,
2002.
4  I use the term “criminal cooperation and organization” because of my allergic reaction to the term “organized crime.” The
latter conveys a specific image popularized by television, one not substantiated by scholarship and experience. However, this
paper does not include all criminal cooperation, much of which is too rudimentary to fit under the rubric of “organized crime,”
rightly understood.
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This is not the same as finding “the bad guys”
and sending them to prison. Rather, this is an
intellectual problem. We need to organize our minds
to understand how offenders cooperate. This
understanding would go beyond any one group of
offenders or any one crime. It would consider how
such cooperation diversifies. It would look at processes
too local for national attention. It must be flexible enough
to deal with new criminal cooperation that emerges
and offenders who change what they are doing. In
short, I am seeking something very general, but still
helpful.
THE NETWORK APPROACH HAS
LIMITS
It has been useful for heuristic purposes to view
organized crime as a social network. That is, offenders
know one another and exchange illicit favors, goods,
or services in some fashion in some sort of human
chain. The network approach should not be dismissed,
and has offered a good stopgap way to study criminal
cooperation and organization. But the network approach
has not solved the problem. It does not tell us which
way influence flows as a general rule – even if it might
assist a particular study. Network analysts have offered
important empirical work, and some genuine findings.
But that’s not a theory of criminal cooperation and
organization. We shall continue learning from the
network analysts, but we must push ahead towards an
intellectual image of criminal cooperation.
THE DRAMATIC FALLACY5
Often the most dramatic crime problems and groups
draw the greatest attention from the public, press, and
police concerned with organized crime. Such attention
is an intellectual distraction. This does not deny that
particular groups of offenders create an extra problem
for society, requiring action. If drug smuggling is of
major public concern, the most organized drug
smugglers may draw the attention of police and
prosecution. But the drug smuggling problem involves
a vast array of small fish. The intellectual study of
organized crime requires understanding what’s less
dramatic and of less public concern as well. In other
words, the study of criminal cooperation and
organization must pay great attention to ordinary
processes not covered in the news.
EVENTS, SEQUENCES, AND SETTINGS
My initial point is that organized crime scholarship pays
too much attention to specific groups of people.
Progress in understanding organized crime requires
shifting focus towards
specific and tangible events,
their specific sequences, and
their specific settings.
In other words, the criminal acts themselves and
the linkages among them provide the basis for organizing
our knowledge and understanding of organized crime.6
The particular people can shift and weave, but the
structure is provided by the events.
Of course, scholars have long noticed events; but
noticing them is not enough. Events, sequences, and
settings must become the organizing principle for
other information. Like a basketball game or football
match -  with substitutions -  the teams and individuals
change, but the field and rules provide the basic
structure. Indeed, criminal individuals and groups are
usually less structured than sports.
A police executive in a large European city
employed surveillance data to discover the “organizing
figure” for local drug sales.7 A week later, the “leader”
was out on the street selling small packages. Whoever
received a shipment of drugs was the “big fish” for a
week or two, and then became a “little fish” again.
5  Borrowed from M. Felson, Crime and Everyday Life, Third Edition, 2003. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
6 Note prior references to work by Clarke and collaborators, as well as Mary McIntosh. The Organisation of Crime. (London:
Macmillan. 1975).
7 Personal communication.
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Even the network changed by week. The big fish this
week shared the business with his friends, but they
were out of luck the following week.
Thus we learn to follow the specific events,
sequences, and settings. These provide the structure
within which social groups and networks work. Of
course, more stable racketeering can be found in some
places, but it’s an empirical question whether that occurs
or not. Look first to the tangible events and settings.
Assume minimal and unstable organization of people,
unless definite evidence shows otherwise. Even after
you discover a stable criminal organization somewhere,
don’t assume that will be true in the future.
OFFENDER CONVERGENCE
SETTINGS
The Brantinghams discovered that crimes cluster
around a local McDonald’s restaurant, and around a
local tough bar.8 Their work has helped many scholars
understand that crime must be analyzed geographically,
and that certain geographic settings are very important
for understanding it. Moreover, removing or limiting
such settings has a major impact on crime both on
location and in its environs.
Offenders are likely to converge in certain settings,
which then become central for crime.  Good hangouts
enable illicit cooperation. More generally, an offender
convergence setting helps set the stage for criminal
acts.9 Offenders can go there shortly before committing
a crime, to find accomplices or to gain information
leading directly to additional crime. For example,
offenders can share information about an impending
drug shipment, or divide that shipment up.10
Offender convergence settings are places that set
the stage for crime by assembling accomplices and
getting an illicit process started. Illicit transactions might
occur in these settings, or might occur later. In either
case, such settings are important for understanding
crime cooperation, and how to interfere with it.
Offender convergence settings will vary by age. Youths
often meet in informal but persistent settings, such as
street corners, a hall in school, or other hangouts,
including bars, fast-food restaurants, video parlors,
parks, and street corners. In Japan, marginal youths
often hang out in pachinko parlors (where legal
gambling occurs). Older offenders might also meet in
marginal bars, street corners, parks, or drug hangouts.
In the early 20th century, pool halls in the United States
were offender hangouts; cities tried to exclude
teenagers from them.
Some offender convergence settings involve
complete criminal transactions, including exchange of
contraband. However, offender convergence settings
might also set the stage for further criminal actions
elsewhere. We need to distinguish arranged meetings
from those that are not arranged in advance. Arranged
meetings might occur in McDonald’s or other public
places allowing brief exchange of information or illicit
goods. However, many informal settings provide
ongoing social life among offenders, who then might
cook up crimes as they go along. In addition,
established racketeers might have offices, social clubs,
or favored restaurants or bars that they completely
dominate to the exclusion of others.
Although some offender convergence settings
might involve exactly the same people, we should not
assume that to be the case. Some tough bars or other
public settings provide a shifting group of persons,
sometimes strangers, sometimes vaguely familiar,
sometimes friends. These settings allow criminal
cooperation to persist even when the particular
persons vary. Thus offender convergence settings
help us understand the structure of criminal
cooperation, even when participation is unstable.
Professor Pierre Tremblay discusses “the search
for suitable co-offenders.” His work does not focus
on the very young offenders, but rather on those old
8 P. L. Brantingham and P. J. Brantingham, “Mobility, Notoriety, and Crime: A Study of Crime Patterns in Urban Nodal Points,”
Journal of Environmental Systems 11 (1982), 89–99.
9 I have developed these ideas at length in “The Process of Co-offending,” in M. J. Smith and D. B. Cornish, Theory for
Practice in Situational Crime Prevention (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press, 2003). (Volume 16 in Crime Prevention Studies
series)
10 Illicit-trade settings permit buyers and sellers of illicit goods and services to transact business. That usually refers to the
end users of drugs or other illegal commodities purchasing from end-sellers. This paper avoids this distinction, which I have
developed elsewhere. See Marcus Felson, Crime and Nature, 2006. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
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enough to be picky about their partners in crime. That
requires that potential accomplices meet in settings
where they can explore and discuss. Totally public
places might not be suitable if they expose offenders
to interference from police, parents, or others. But some
public access provides an offender with more contacts
with possible accomplices. We arrive at a view of the
underworld that does not deny or minimize the role of
social networks and groupings, yet depends on
recurrent settings where criminal cooperation can grow.
In some of these settings, co-offenders find one
another rather easily. An offender convergence setting
provides crime structure and continuity - despite
instabilities among individuals, groups, or networks.
Even if specific participants change, the criminogenic
setting can persist. A frequent motivation for entering
such settings is to socialize, with criminogenic
information transmitted only in passing. Thus offenders
converge in the bar just to talk, but also cook up some
deals. But some offenders enter convergence settings,
such as a tough bar, with crime in mind. I suspect that
many places where offenders linger combine these
functions. In any case, removing offender convergence
settings can help deplete the process of crime
cooperation without necessarily requiring more arrests.
Of course, a total denial of freedom of assembly
can reduce crime, too. Such a denial is antithetical to a
free society. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights does not include these provisions:
· The right to get as drunk as possible among
a group that’s just as drunk.
· The right to trade stolen goods in public
places.
· The right to take over a public park and
kick everybody else out.
· The right for businesses to grow by
facilitating crime.
· The right to sell heroin to new teenage
customers in public places.
As you shall see, society can protect public places
while minimizing arrests. Indeed, focusing on settings
is far less dangerous to freedom than focusing on
human suspects.
THE DEGREE OF CONCEALMENT
Crime generally requires a degree of concealment. This
process is largely physical. Concealment depends upon
the location of a setting where transactions occur, as
well as features of the transactions themselves.
Concealment varies directly with the privacy of a
setting. That privacy can be accomplished in urban
settings when public access is prevented. But privacy
can also be accomplished in remote places where illicit
plants are grown or contraband is manufactured.
Concealment varies inversely with the size and
quantity of contraband, as well as with the transaction
time required. A few small pills are easily hidden, and
quickly exchanged. The ideal concealment occurs in a
very private setting with a small amount of contraband
and a quick transaction. The worst risk to the offender
occurs in public settings with large amounts transacted
slowly. This equation sums up the point:
                       Privacy of setting
 Required Concealment  ∝ ———————————————————————— .
            Size and quantity of contraband, Transaction time required
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In other words, required concealment is directly
proportional to the privacy of the setting and inversely
proportional to the size and quantity of contraband, as
well as the transaction time required by the crime.
In general, a bulky and slow transaction requires
more privacy, while a smaller-scale transaction might
occur safely with minimal privacy. We can immediately
see that illegal processes must differ in the privacy
they require for safe completion, since illicit transactions
vary in size, quantity, and span of time. These technical
variations among crime forms will normally impel
participants towards different privacy requirements.
Such privacy requirements are important for
understanding each type of crime cooperation.
REACHING THE PUBLIC
Some crime transactions depend on reaching the public.
That places offenders in a bind – on the one hand they
need to conceal their actions, but on the other hand
they wish to find customers. Professor John Eck of
the University of Cincinnati offers us important insights
on drug transaction places. He starts his classic article
as follows:
Pity the plight of the retail drug dealer. He
has valuable drugs that he wants to sell. He
also may have some cash from previous
sales. He wants to make more sales. But if
he approaches a possible customer he may
be approaching a cop, a person working for
cops, or somebody who is ready to take his
drugs and cash by force. Our dealer must
protect himself while contacting customers
and making sales.
Consider the plight of the active retail drug
buyer. She has cash and maybe other
valuables. If she approaches the possible
seller to make a buy, she may find that she
is dealing with a cop, or somebody who
wants to take her money but provide no
drugs. Our customer must protect herself
while contacting sellers and making
purchases.11
Professor Eck notes that drug dealers and buyers
make their trades using either social networks (based
on prior acquaintance) or routine activities. If they use
social networks, they are not dependent on special
settings, and are more secure. But the use of networks
restricts the number of customers a seller can find easily,
and limits the buyer to just a few sellers.
That’s why drug trades often rely on settings
where routine activities bring more opportunities for
drug exchanges. That makes it possible for strangers
to exchange illicit drugs. The best drug sales areas are
those where both buyer and seller already conduct
legitimate routine activities. Drug markets using the
routine activity solution have three geographic
characteristics:
· Sellers try to stay at specific places, or to
move very short distances.
· Illicit markets are located on arterial routes
or near where lots of legitimate activities
occur.
· Place managers - those controlling settings
for legitimate purposes - are either absent
or corrupted.
This kind of drug market can be large and serve
many people. For example, outdoor drug markets tend
to spread many more illicit drugs to a wider clientele.
Some of the best drug vendors locate in small apartment
buildings with no apartment manager and no locked
gates, but easy access. Sometimes drugs are openly
sold through windows, from or to cars, or via “runners”
who transfer the product and money, or using “touts”
who draw customers into or toward the sales settings.
The point is that open drug sales widen the market for
the seller, and enable recruitment of new drug abusers.
11 John E. Eck, “A General Model of the Geography of Illicit Retail Marketplaces.” In Eck and D. Weisburd, Editors, Crime
Prevention Studies: Crime and Place. (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press; and Devon, UK: Willan Press, 1995). (volume 4 in
Crime Prevention Studies series)
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This very openness is very useful for offenders
when police are absent or inactive, and when neighbors
are indifferent or afraid. Yet when society mobilizes
itself, such drug-sale settings are highly vulnerable
to police action, environmental design, and civil
abatement - the use of civil and administrative law to
influence property owners to remove illegal activities.
Rana Sampson contributed an important pamphlet
on preventing drug dealing from privately owned
apartments.12 She combined what she learned at
Harvard Law School, and as an undercover narcotics
officer, with a review of academic literature and police
experience. Officials can be surprisingly effective in
reducing these drug-trade settings. Alex Harocopos and
Mike Hough have shown how similar principles can
help interfere with open-air drug markets.13 It is
increasingly evident that removing these settings can
undermine illicit sales quickly, with lasting impact.14
The drug seller finds himself in a bind. He must
give up a certain amount of concealment in order to
gain business. That exposes him to counteraction. This
vulnerability is the key to a counterintuitive policy
recommendation. The most common prescription for
controlling organized crime is to cut off the head – to
find and arrest the most important offenders. I would
argue that it makes more sense to cut off the feet, that
is, to remove or impair the settings where cooperative
crime meets the public or where small-time criminals
meet one another. The point is that organized crime is
most vulnerable in its most public settings. Moreover,
those settings are most subject to situational interference
with minimal arrests. Before explaining this, I take up
the issue of Internet usage.
INTERNET AND ILLICIT
TRANSACTIONS
Clearly the Internet has been used for illicit transactions.
The Internet sets up buyers of illegal commodities for
fraud, attacks, and other dangers. It also makes it
possible for buyers and sellers to exchange perverse
goods and services as promised. It has also been used
for police stings and police surveillance, but a whole
range of situational prevention measures have been
adopted while avoiding arrests. Over time many public
authorities and private sector computer managers have
learned to defeat certain Internet  abuses by monitoring
systems electronically and thwarting illicit
communications. Universities have learned to improve
security simply by shutting off students who abuse their
system, or even threatening to do so. One need not
arrest people. Unfortunately, many police monitor
Internet abuse mainly with arrest in mind, hence making
themselves highly inefficient. How much more cost-
effective it would be to send e-mail messages, signed
by the police, asking the offender to cease? How much
easier it would be to disrupt illicit websites than to arrest
people who click in? As experience accrues, authorities
are learning better to defeat forms of Internet abuse in
a cost-effective way, using situational prevention.15 The
use of the Internet to organize criminal activities will in
any case depend on the specific activity, and the
responses will vary accordingly in method and success.
We should not assume in advance that the Internet
makes all criminal cooperation uncontainable.
Surprisingly, computer transactions are more public than
most people realize, paradoxically increasing both
offender opportunities and their vulnerabilities. I suggest
that the Internet only transforms crime if allowed to do
so. Even then, it cannot transform all stages of crime,
12 Rana Sampson, “Drug Dealing in Privately Owned Apartment Complexes” (n.d.). Available from the Center for Problem
Oriented Policing, http://www.popcenter.org (accessed September 3, 2005).
13 A. Harocopos and M. Hough, “Drug Dealing in Open-Air Markets” (2005). Available from the Center for Problem Oriented
Policing, http://www.popcenter.org (accessed September 3, 2005). See also Rana Sampson, “Advancing Problem-oriented
Policing: Lessons from Dealing with Drug Markets,” in Johannes Knutsson, (ed.), Problem-oriented Policing: From Innovation
to Mainstream (Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press; and Devon, UK: Willan Press, 2003). (volume 15 in Crime Prevention
Studies series)
14 Some illicit trades involve two settings. Sellers of contraband might solicit on the street, then take the customer to an
abandoned spot. On the way both are vulnerable to police action, as well as environmental design to interfere with their
criminal process. There’s good reason for offenders to prefer a suitable setting for crime’s aftermath and to minimize the time
and distance traveled when vulnerable.
15 See Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke, Superhighway Robbery: Preventing E-commerce Crime. 2003. Portland, OR:
Willan. Matthew Williams, Policing and Cybersociety: The Maturation of Regulation within an Online Community. Policing &
Society, Vol. 16, No. 4, September 2006. Sheridan Morris, The Future of Netcrime Now. (Parts 1 and 2). Home Office Online
Report 62/04 & 63/04, December, 2004. Available from http://www.crimereduction.gov.uk/internet01.htm (accessed October 19,
2006).
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or protect offenders from authorities and, most of
all, from one another.
It is easy to be seduced by discussion of new
technologies used in crime, forgetting that so much
of the illicit process is old fashioned and physical.
Even new forms of crime have physical requirements,
such as public access to anonymous computers and
business irresponsibility in enforcing system rules.
Indeed,
· Many illegal transactions depend on
sales of commodities to some kind of public,
including new customers who need a
visible location to check out sellers prior
to the transaction.
· Police seek to arrest one offender in
order to find another. That gives offenders
an incentive to hide their home location
from their accomplices in case they wish
to escape notice.
· Most offenders are more afraid of one
another than they are of police. One
offender might prefer to meet another in
a public or semipublic place to avoid
attack. Tipping off your home location is
risky.
· Computer frauds often take advantage
of illicit customers. They have no recourse,
at all.
We need to distinguish those illicit computer
contacts that allow computer delivery from the ones
that depend on a physical delivery process. In the
latter cases, crime must surface in the physical world.
In the former case, crime must surface in the public
areas of the Internet. Surfacing is the issue.
FOUR LEVELS OF EXPOSURE
Crime must surface because so many of its processes
require that to happen. Nonetheless offenders might like
to locate crime where they can be safe. For periods of
time, they might do just that. But their world changes.
Accomplices in crime often become unavailable, due to
illness, injury, arrest, migration, volatile crime interests,
drunkenness, or a developing reputation as unreliable.
That’s why offenders must replenish their supply of
potential accomplices and/or customers. New liaisons
normally depend on public or semi-public convergence
settings. Even those who know one another and commit
crimes in private locations might introduce new people to
a private setting, broadening the sphere of criminal contact.
A very interesting question is when and whether totally
private settings are safer for offenders than other settings.
It is very common for experts in organized crime to
distinguish the Underworld from the Upperworld. The
latter term carries some ambiguity. On the one hand, the
Upperworld implies legality as well as visibility. Yet illegal
activities use the visible world as well.
Thus we cannot escape the notion that offenders
must gain physical access to one place or another. That
brings up an important question: How locations are
supervised – however informally. Following the late
Oscar Newman, a public setting has so much access
that it effectively belongs to nobody and is essentially
unsupervised.16 Even a privately owned setting can be
largely unsupervised, hence highly public in access, and
quite suitable for crime. It can be a good place for total
strangers to make an illicit transaction without much risk
of interference. It can allow very casual acquaintances
to find one another for dubious purposes. It can also help
people arrange illicit encounters in private settings nearby.
A totally private setting is controlled by a very few
people away from public view. Even if it is publicly owned
(such as social or public housing), it can still be privatized
in access. Crimes can occur there, of course, but
strangers and casual acquaintances will not find one
another that easily.
16 Oscar Newman, Defensible Space. New York: Macmillan. 1972. See also Oscar Newman and T. Kingsley, (1995). Defensible
Space: Deterring Crime and Building Community. Washington DC: US Department of Housing and Urban Development. One
needs not agree with all aspects of Newman’s work to accept the basic point about supervision of space.
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We also need to consider semipublic and
semiprivate settings. These are very important for
crime to occur. The following scale helps us understand
how cooperative crime surfaces, and where it is most
exposed to interference:
1. Public Settings – Minimal   supervision,
easy contact with strangers
2. Semipublic Settings – Transition and
transfer settings seen by many, but not all
3. Semiprivate Settings – Transition  and
transfer settings seen by a few
4. Private Settings – Limited access
As noted earlier, this scale refers to supervision,
not ownership. Thus a public or social housing complex
contains “private” apartments. A privately-owned mall
has public access. When Oscar Newman presented
these four categories, he was thinking mostly about
street crime. He argued that public settings made such
crime much easier, while private and semiprivate
settings usually reduced crime by giving citizens more
control of their own space. Applying these ideas,
planners have closed off social housing to protect its
residents.
The same principles apply in an interesting way
to organized crime. Organized offenses often require
people and commodities to flow across all four types
of setting. Thus farmers in another country grow hemp
openly, relying on their remoteness from anybody who
might interfere. The product is processed in semipublic
settings, then shipped through private conveyances, or
concealed somehow in public. The actual sales of
contraband occur in various places. Some is sold in the
public park. Some is sold in semipublic spots that are
largely abandoned. Some is sold in semiprivate spots
and some in entirely private locations. The use of these
settings depends on market niche, size of package, and
risks one needs to take.
Society is most upset about illicit actions in private
settings. Yet a substantial part of organized criminal
activity crosses all four types of setting. Indeed, much
of organized crime depends substantially on sales in
public and semipublic places. These are available to
crime largely because society has abrogated its
authority to regulate large public portions of major
metropolitan areas. Thus the most serious
contributor to organized crime is the public sector
of society, as it neglects highly visible parts of its
own environment.
Indeed, society can reduce organized crime of
several types by reducing public sales of contraband,
by no longer abandoning public space to selfish abuse.
It is very easy for public officials and the public itself
to dismiss its crime problem by blaming deep and hidden
forces, rather than looking to its own neglect of its local
metropolitan environment.
Interestingly, the Internet also has public,
semipublic, semiprivate, and private aspects. Often its
illicit uses occur because the public and semipublic
portions of the Internet are unsupervised. The
businesses involved have little incentive to protect the
public against crime, and so they leave it alone. As
with physical space, when nobody owns the problem,
nobody owns the solution. However, many solutions
have been devised and applied, and are most effective
when oriented towards situational prevention.17
By using situational crime prevention and problem-
oriented policing, by redesigning public parks, by paying
closer attention to apartment construction designs,
organized criminal actors would lose a good share of
their illicit opportunity. This often reminds people of
“broken windows policing,” but there’s more to it.
Sometimes it is indeed important to control minor
offenses in order to prevent major ones.18 But the means
and linkages need to be specified. “Broken windows”
can be too vague, opening itself to misinterpretation.
But an enlightened view of the approach recognizes
that
· Not all minor offenses lead to major
offenses;
17 Part 2 of the Morris document, just cited, is specifically devoted to situational prevention of netcrime.
18 George W. Kelling and Catherine Coles, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities.
( New York: The Free Press, 1996, Touchstone, 1998. The authors are less oriented towards arrests than they are portrayed by
critics. Situational prevention especially seeks to avoid arrests by designing places and management systems.
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· Minor arrests can often be reduced without
multiplying arrests;19
· Zero-tolerance does not really exist, since
police must use discretion and since criminal
justice processes are very expensive; and
· Situational crime prevention is a repertoire
of many techniques, most of which reduce
the pressure upon police and the degree of
punitive action.
Unfortunately, news headlines feature the more
emotional and extreme claims about crime prevention,
such as zero tolerance, heavy punishment, social
prevention, social justice, and arresting kingpins.
Managing safe public parks is far less glamorous, and
requires ongoing effort with minimal confrontation. Such
effort is our best chance at crime prevention, since the
Underworld depends on the Upperworld. We need to
specify how; then we can begin to do something about
it.
REMOVING CRIME OPPORTUNITY
A major empirical and practical crime prevention effort
is underway in the United States, Britain, and certain
other nations. But let’s not exaggerate. These
innovations are not shared by most officials or by the
public, for whom discussion of crime prevention and
control remains on a much less creative level.
Nonetheless, the hope for a better future is conveyed
well by at least two websites:
www.popcenter.org
www.crimereduction.gov.uk/
These sources include numerous ideas for
reducing offender convergence and transaction settings.
Experience is accruing to prove that situational crime
prevention and problem oriented policing has great
success with a vast array of crimes. The increasing
research demonstrates many successes in controlling
crime-oriented bars and pubs, as well as drug dealing
in private apartments, and drug-dealing in open-air
markets. Even reductions in property crimes are
relevant: Such ordinary offenses help many people
purchase contraband, in turn feeding organized crime
in a broader sense. The pamphlets mentioned give
increased attention to the interplay among criminal
activities. The bad news is that the growth of one type
of crime very often feeds several other types. The good
news is that curtailing one type of crime very often
reduces several other types.
Moreover, researchers are discovering that the
old “crime displacement” hypothesis is largely wrong.
That hypothesis stated that preventing crime here will
merely push it there. I will not go into the several types
of displacement now, but we now find strong indication
that crime prevented is largely crime depleted. In fact,
prevention often leads to a diffusion of benefits – crime
reduced here contributes to reductions in nearby times
and places.
Those who do not really read about situational crime
prevention still have opinions about it:
· “Situational prevention only applies to
property crime.” In fact, many forms of
violence have been directly and indirectly
reduced using situational measures. Changes
in barrooms are a good example, as
mentioned above.
· “Situational prevention only reduces crime
slowly.” In fact, specific slices of crime can
be reduced overnight, or even wiped out,
through situational measures. The
widespread use of steering wheel locks is
an example. However, one must keep slicing
to have a broader impact.
· “Situational prevention does not apply to
organized crime.” The invention of double-
entry bookkeeping reduced cooperative
crime long ago. Instituting proper auditing
systems quickly removes the chance for
19 In the worst areas, more arrests might be needed at first to regain turf that is entirely controlled by offenders, but in most
cases fewer arrests are the norm.
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crime against and by means of ordinary
organizations.
· “The development of the Internet makes
situational prevention obsolete.” As
mentioned earlier, situational measures have
sliced away at problems. Viruses and various
forms of Internet fraud have been reduced,
and more can be accomplished in the future
if people try to do so.
· “Situational prevention only helps the rich.”
In fact, situational prevention has some of
its greatest successes in protecting low-
income housing and theft of old cars owned
by poor people.
· “Situational prevention interferes with
human rights.” In fact, most situational
prevention measures are unobtrusive. The
few exceptions are not necessary for most
crime prevention.20
· “Situational prevention has not been
substantiated by evidence, since often studies
do not have large numbers of cases and clean
experimentation.” In fact, situational
prevention is supported by a preponderance
of evidence over many studies, not by
perfection in any one study. In crime
research, most claims of a clean experiment
are bogus, anyway.
As we learn more about preventing obvious
crime, we have a much better chance to thwart hidden
criminal cooperation that depends on it.
THE WEB OF CRIME COOPERATION
The interplay of many crimes produces a web of
interdependence.
Small time thefts lead to fencing stolen
goods,
Providing thieves money,
For purchasing small amounts of illegal drugs,
Contributing to small-time drug dealing,
Feeding into large-scale drug dealing.
This web of crime cooperation exposes each
crime to a larger environment, without which it cannot
thrive. (I have explained elsewhere the multitude of
interdependencies between illegal and legal activities.21)
These ideas lead me towards an unusual set of
recommendations for understanding organized crime
in society, as well as reducing it:
1. Focus on the acts, not the group engaging in
it.
2. Divide cooperative and organized crimes into
very specific types.
3. Study the vast variation in criminal
cooperation and organization.
4. Assume minimal levels of cooperative
complexity, that such crime is seldom
ingenious.
5. Don’t follow the money; follow the physical
transactions.
6. Don’t look for deep secrets; look for the
obvious and almost obvious.
7. Find out how one crime depends on another.
8. Find out how crime feeds off legitimate and
marginal activities.
9. Tease out the sequence of events for ongoing
criminal cooperation.
10. Interfere with that sequence, access to the
customer, or modus operandi.
20 See Marcus Felson and Ronald V. Clarke, “The Ethics of Situational Crime Prevention.” Pages 197-218 in G. Newman, R.V.
Clarke and S. Shoham, (eds.), Rational Choice and Situational Crime Prevention. Aldershot: Dartmouth Press, 1997. Also see
an entire book on this topic edited by Andrew von Hirsch, David Garland, A. Wakefield, Ethical and Social Perspectives on
Situational Crime Prevention. Portland, Oregon: Wakefield. 2000.
21 See Marcus Felson, “Crime and Nature”. 2006. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
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11. Forget the bosses; monitor and thwart the
opportunity for small-time crime, and
12. Use situational prevention to reduce crime
opportunities that feed organized crime, directly
and indirectly.
It’s quite a bit of work to figure out the
interdependencies among many types of crime, and
between criminal and legal activities. The efforts to do
so increasingly pay off in finding out how to control
organized criminal efforts. For example, Canadian
authorities realized that marihuana growing operations
depend on very large amounts of electricity, thus giving
up their locations as well as providing a policy handle
to close them down. Similar thinking is reflected in
recent European literature on organized crime control,
and so it should be.
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